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ABSTRACT
Ethereum, a cryptocurrency currently valued at 46 billion US dollars, has grown over
6,500% in the last 12 months [6]. Despite the growth in value, we still have very limited
Ethereum network visibility. In this thesis, we analyze the Ethereum network from two
vantage points: the DEVp2p network and the Ethereum Mainnet. The DEVp2p peer-to-
peer (P2P) network was developed specifically for and ultimately underlies the Ethereum
Mainnet. We examine overall composition of the DEVp2p network. We analyze our peer
connections on the Ethereum Mainnet—the main Ethereum network established on top of
DEVp2p. We compare the Ethereum network’s properties to those of other well-studied
P2P networks, namely BitTorrent and Gnutella. We develop novel techniques to measure
the Ethereum P2P network and gain visibility into this previously opaque network.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The rise of public interest in the cryptocurrency market has resulted in a total market
cap of over 240 billion US dollars [6]. Due to this, the stability of cryptocurrency networks,
in which performance directly influences users’ financial gain, has become an important
research topic. For years, Bitcoin, the largest in the market, and alternatives based on
Bitcoin have seen continuous effort in analyzing properties and monitoring health of the
networks [1, 8, 24, 26]. In contrast, Ethereum, another cryptocurrency whose system design
is fundamentally different from Bitcoin, has not seen as much effort in understanding its
network.
Ethereum is commonly referred as a cryptocurrency competitor to Bitcoin, but it is
actually much more than a currency. The Ethereum Foundation explains that its token,
Ether, is not intended to be a currency; it is a byproduct of a much larger vision, a fuel
for operating a “world computer” [12, 13, 14]. Ethereum enables decentralized logic of the
“world computer” by providing a platform for blockchain-based smart contracts, which are
programs that enforce rules set by creators. Execution of a contract is validated by all
the blockchain participants, so it runs without downtime, fraud, or third-party interference.
Bitcoin also facilitates the concept of a smart contract, in which usage is limited to currency
transactions. What differentiates Ethereum from Bitcoin is “the built-in Turing-complete
programming language that allows anyone to create contracts for any usage beyond currency
transaction” [3]. The flexibility offered by Ethereum’s smart contracts has attracted many
users, including developers and investors, and Ethereum has become the second largest
cryptocurrency valued at 46 billion US dollars [6]. As its development gains momentum,
there have been many studies within the application layer of Ethereum, such as building
off-chain payment channels or applications of smart contracts. Meanwhile, there has not
been any work exploring its network structure.
In this thesis, we present novel techniques to measure the Ethereum’s peer-to-peer
(P2P) network and provide network visibility into this previously opaque network. We
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collect nodes’ information by scanning the network with a number of underlying networking
protocols. Based on the information collected over a five-month period, we examine the
population of the DEVp2p network, Ethereum’s underlying P2P network. Next, we analyze
the Ethereum Mainnet—the main Ethereum network established on top of DEVp2p. We
maintain peer connections with Mainnet nodes and observe their characteristics. We compare
the Ethereum network’s properties to those of other well-studied P2P networks, namely
BitTorrent and Gnutella. We also investigate anomalies in how information propagates
on the Mainnet and discuss their effects on the network’s performance. In summary, the
contributions of this thesis are as follows:
• A breakdown of the Ethereum network
• A comparison of Ethereum network properties with other P2P networks
• An analysis of information propagation
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CHAPTER 2: RELATED WORK
The main value of Ethereum (and cryptocurrencies in general) is to provide dis-
tributed, decentralized consensus on valid transactions and smart contracts. Formal mod-
eling has demonstrated the fault tolerance of Bitcoin [23] when Byzantine faults account
for less than half of the network, with similar results applying to Ethereum [5]. Several
replacement Byzantine consensus protocols have been proposed to improve scalability and
reduce consensus latency [11, 19].
In practice, the performance and robustness of Byzantine consensus protocols are
highly reliant on network topology, which can cause a small number of failures to translate
into a large number of Byzantine faults. For instance, certain network topologies can be
fully partitioned by a few network failures, leading to large subgraphs that are considered
byzantine faults. Network topology is especially important in random graph networks, and
many algorithms have been proposed for distributed consensus in sensor networks [17, 18,
25]. Ethereum also operates on a random graph by design, but no work has examined the
topology of the Ethereum network, leaving the possibility of fragile network topology and
high consensus delay. Initial evaluation of information propagation in the Bitcoin network
has demonstrated that slow consensus can lead to high occurrence of forks, which further
delays consensus and increases wasted computation [8].
Several methods have been applied to infer the topology of Bitcoin’s P2P network.
Miller et al. [24] used specific Bitcoin client implementation behavior to infer connectivity
between peers. Bitcoin nodes send GetAddr messages to connected peers to get Addr re-
sponses that include information on additional connectable Bitcoin nodes. In the ubiquitous
bitcoind client, the timestamp field in Addr messages inadvertently leaked peer connectivity,
which was used to construct Bitcoin’s network topology graph. The peer-information leaking
behavior was fixed in March 2015, nullifying future applications of this technique. In re-
sponse, Neudecker et al. [26] developed a graph-theoretic technique for modeling the Bitcoin
flooding P2P network. Model distributions and parameters were estimated by comparing
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simulated behavior to actual Bitcoin network measurements. Maximum likelihood estima-
tion was then applied to timing data for an individual message arriving from different peers
to calculate path lengths between nodes. The technique is limited in efficacy and coverage,
since it only handles nodes that generate transactions with ~40% precision and recall. Relay
nodes that do not create transactions and merely pass messages along are unaccounted for.
Outside of the cryptocurrency domain, there has been much effort on studying proper-
ties of P2P networks, particularly file-sharing systems. Saroiu et al. [31] crawled the Napster
and Gnutella networks and identified their properties, such as population, bottleneck band-
widths, latencies, availability, churn, and degree of connections. Qiao et al. [29] performed a
combination of passive and active measurement on the Gnutella and Overnet networks and
evaluated their resilience, message overhead, and query performance. Pouwelse et al. [28]
studied the BitTorrent network over a period of 8 months and found that the network suffers
from the unavailability of the network’s central components, such as seed trackers. Dinger
et al. [9] analyzed the performance of two decentralized bootstrapping approaches, namely
local host caches and random address probing, in the BitTorrent network. We perform a di-
rect comparison of these networks with Ethereum’s P2P network throughout the remainder
of the study.
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CHAPTER 3: BACKGROUND
In order to participate in the Ethereum blockchain consensus, nodes first need to join
the DEVp2p network—the underlying peer-to-peer (P2P) network of Ethereum. Finding
another DEVp2p node and making a P2P connection involve 2 different networking protocols,
namely the RLPx node discovery protocol and the DEVp2p Wire protocol. On top of
the established DEVp2p connection, peers use the Ethereum Wire subprotocol to establish
Ethereum connections in order to participate in blockchain consensus. In this chapter, we
explain each protocol according to the official protocol specifications [4, 20, 21] and the
source code of the official Golang implementation of the protocols [15].
3.1. RLPX NODE DISCOVERY PROTOCOL
RLPx node discovery protocol is based on the routing protocol of Kademlia, a P2P
distributed hash table (DHT) known for its use of XOR-based metric topology [22]. Like
Kademlia, the protocol sends messages over UDP and the discovery mechanism relies on
each node’s routing table that stores other nodes’ address information in buckets based on
XOR distance between its own ID and others.
In the routing table, each node address entry consists of node ID, IP address, TCP
port, and UDP port. If a node address does not specify UDP port, the protocol assumes
it’s the same as the TCP port. The size of each bucket in the routing table (parameter
k in Kademlia) is 16 and node lookup concurrency (parameter α) is 3. For XOR distance
comparison (parameter b), the protocol considers 8 bits per hop.
Ping and Pong messages are used to check valid and active node addresses. FindNode
is used to request other nodes to find the nodes closest to a target ID. Recipients respond
with a Neighbors message containing the 16 closest nodes according to their routing tables.
3.1.1. Differences from Kademlia
RLPx node discovery protocol differs from design of Kademlia in several ways. First,
instead of using random 160-bits, a node’s 512-bit public key is used as the ID. Second, the
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XOR distance metric is based the 256-bit SHA3—Keccak256 to be precise—hashes of the
IDs. Third, messages are signed to ensure integrity. Lastly, the discovery protocol does not
implement Store and FindValue messages, preventing other nodes from directly interacting
with routing tables.
3.1.2. Initial Bootstrap Phase
When joining the DEVp2p network (or participating in the node discovery) for the
first time, each client queries “bootstrap nodes”—whose addresses are hardcoded in the
source code—to find other nodes on the network. The client verifies the node addresses
learned through the discovery and dials them to establish new P2P connections. If it fails
to find any peer, it tries one of the bootstrap nodes and waits until the next discovery cycle
for new node addresses.
3.2. DEVP2P WIRE PROTOCOL
DEVp2p is used to establish P2P connections and is designed to support various
subprotocols. The protocol uses port 30303 as its default listening port, but nodes are free
to choose any other port to accept connections.
3.2.1. Message Types
Hello is the first message that nodes are required to exchange during new P2P connection
handshake. Until the handshake is complete, no other types of messages may be sent across
the connection. The message contains p2pVersion (DEVp2p protocol version), clientId
(client name), listenPort (TCP listener port), caps (a list of supported subprotocol names
and versions), and nodeId (node’s 512-bit pubkey). If no matching subprotocols are found
between nodes during the handshake, the connection is disconnected, with reason being
Useless peer.
Disconnect messages are sent to inform a peer that the sender is ending the connection
soon. The recipient of the message should disconnect immediately. The sender can include
an integer number specifying the reason for disconnection.
Ping and Pong messages are used to check presence between peers.
GetPeers and Peers messages are mentioned in the documentation but noted as “not
implemented”. It appears that the messages were meant to serve similar purposes as Bitcoin’s
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GetAddr and Addr messages, exchanging a list of known active peers [2]. To our knowledge,
the protocol does not provide any other method for learning other node’s peers. Note that
the discovery protocol’s FindNode and Neighbors messages provide nodes participating in
the discovery, not necessarily active peers
3.2.2. Subprotocols
Subprotocols, like the Ethereum Wire subprotocol, are application protocols that run
on top of DEVp2p connections. Each subprotocol has its own message sets and structure,
but the messages are encapsulated within the DEVp2p packets when sent.
3.3. ETHEREUM WIRE SUBPROTOCOL
Ethereum Wire subprotocol defines the Ethereum blockchain consensus protocol and
provides messages used to sync blockchain with peers [4]. We describe the protocol based on
the most recent version of Ethereum, 63; however, we omit the fast synchronization messages
introduced in version 63 as they are not involved in our experiments.
3.3.1. Message Types
Status is the first message that peers are required to exchange during new Ethereum con-
nection handshake. Until the handshake is complete, no other types of messages may be
sent across the connection. The message carries information on the current state of the local
Ethereum blockchain, namely protocolVersion, networkId (network or chain ID), td (to-
tal difficulty of current state), bestHash (hash of the best known block), and genesisHash
(hash of the genesis block). During the handshake, peers check networkId and genesisHash
to verify that they are on the same network (participating in the same blockchain). If
protocolVersion, networkId, or genesisHash does not match, the Ethereum connection
and the underlying P2P connection is disconnected, with reason being Useless peer.
NewBlockHashes is used to announce hashes of new blocks that appear on the network.
Any block hash marked as already known to a peer is not sent to the peer.
Transactions is used to propagate one or more transactions. Only the processable trans-
actions in the pending queue are propagated. If a received transaction is valid but not
processable based on the current state of the blockchain, it is held in the future queue.
More detail on transaction queues are provided in Section 3.3.4.
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GetBlockHeaders and BlockHeaders are most commonly used to exchange block head-
ers while fetching announced blocks. They are often used by new Ethereum connections—
after passing the handshake phase—to verify if a peer participates in the same blockchain.
GetBlockBodies and BlockBodies are used to exchange block contents while fetching
announced blocks.
NewBlock is used to propagate a new block and new total difficulty. If there are n peers
that do not already know about the block, the block is propagated to only
√
n peers. If
the message is received from a peer, the peer’s status is updated according to the new block
information. The bestHash is updated to the parent hash of the new block, and the td is
updated to the new total difficulty minus the new block’s difficulty.
3.3.2. Ethereum Networks
There exists more than one Ethereum network. Each network has its own blockchain.
Networks are generally identified with networkId, such as the examples shown below:
• 0 - Olympic (unused)
• 1 - Homestead-Metropolis (Mainnet)
• 2 - Morden (unused)
• 3 - Ropsten (Testnet)
• 4 - Rinkeby (Geth Testnet)
• 42 - Kovan (Parity Testnet)
However, as mentioned in Section 3.3.1, networkId alone does not define a unique network.
Most networks has a unique combination of networkId and genesisHash. In some cases,
the pair is not enough to differentiate networks, and nodes exchange additional information
to verify that they participate in the same network. The most prominent example is the
EthereumMainnet and the Ethereum Classic sharing the same networkId and genesisHash.
The two networks were originally on the same blockchain but were split as a result of a hard
fork in July 2016. The Mainnet nodes exchange a specific block header to verify that they
participate in the same forked blockchain.
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3.3.3. Blockchain Synchronization
The client syncs its blockchain with the best peer, the peer with the highest total
difficulty. The best peer is determined under two conditions: (1) force sync cycle of a 10-
second interval, (2) a new Ethereum connection resulting in at least 5 connections. The
client updates each peer’s status according to the information of the new blocks it receives
from the peer. Throughout the syncing, the client updates the targeting block with the best
block of the newly-chosen best peer. Until the initial sync completes, the client ignores all
transaction messages—they are not relayed or even processed.
3.3.4. Transaction Queues
Ethereum clients have two different queues for storing transactions, pending and
future. The pending queue contains transactions that are ready to be propagated to
other peers. The future queue contains transactions that are validated but should be
propagated at a later time. The client uses each transaction’s nonce to determine whether
to propagate it now or later. The nonce is a number assigned by the Ethereum blockchain
account sending the transaction. Every time a transaction from the account is confirmed,
the account increments the nonce by 1. When validating a transaction, the client checks
the sending account’s current nonce on the blockchain. If the nonce of the transaction is
lower than the account’s current nonce, then the client drops the transaction. If the nonces
match, then the transaction is added to the pending queue. If the transaction nonce is
higher, then the transaction is added to the future queue. As the blockchain updates—i.e.
the client learns about a new block—the client checks the nonce of the transactions in the
queues again and repeats the process.
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY
Our study of the Ethereum network consists of understanding the network popula-
tion based on data collected from periodic scans and analyzing how information propagate
throughout the network. We collect DEVp2p node addresses using the RLPx node discovery
protocol and scan them to verify their availability and collect additional information. Based
on the collected information, we identify potential Ethereum nodes. We maintain peer con-
nections with the nodes for an extensive amount of time and analyze information received
from them.
We implement our scanning utility and peering client based on Geth, an Ethereum
client that uses the official Golang implementation of the Ethereum protocols [15]. Our
choice is based on the assumption that Geth’s protocol implementation is compatible with
majority of the network, a commonly accepted view supported by statistics available at
ethernodes.org1. We initially used version 1.6.7 stable as our base model and con-
tinued to apply changes from newer versions when officially released, in order to remain
compatible with rest of the network.
We first discuss our initial study of Geth’s behaviors in Section 4.1. We explain our
approaches to node discovery in Section 4.2 and scanning in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, we
describe the data collection process and discuss the preliminary results. Lastly, Section 4.5
discusses the changes we make to Geth to enable maintaining a large number of connections.
4.1. CLIENT BEHAVIORS
At various points throughout our study, we observed how a Geth instance with default
settings interacts with its peers. Specifically, we looked at the traffic volume distribution by
message types and the reasons of peer disconnections. In this section, we discuss our findings
based on the logs from our latest instance run on November 13th, 2017. The client started
syncing with the Ethereum Mainnet blockchain from a clean state at 00:10 am and was
1an Ethereum network monitoring website frequently cited by digital media, such as CoinDesk, that cover
blockchain technology and cryptocurrency [27]
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manually stopped around 03:17 am, about 47 minutes after it finished syncing. We logged
the number of sent and received messages every 15 seconds, the number of peers every 5
seconds, and the details of all peer disconnections.
4.1.1. Traffic volume
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Figure 4.1: Traffic volume and number of peers
In Figure 4.1, we compare the volume of P2P and discovery traffic, both sent and
received, to the number of peers over time. The P2P traffic volume follows a pattern similar
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to that of the number of peers. It abruptly drops and remains around 25 messages per
second around the time the client completes syncing its blockchain. We see the volume
rises again as it begins to participate in relaying new information. The discovery traffic
volume decreases with more peer connections. It drops to almost 0 messages per second
when the client reaches 13 peers, implying that discovery stopped because the client reached
the maximum allowed number of peers.
P2P traffic distribution
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Figure 4.2: Sent and received P2P traffic volume
Figure 4.2 shows that the volume of sent traffic surpasses that of received traffic once
the client finishes syncing and starts relaying new blocks and transactions. In Figure 4.3, we
see that the volume of P2P maintenance traffic is negligible compared to that of application
traffic.
RLPx discovery traffic distribution
In Figure 4.4, we see that Ping-Pong exchanges are more frequent than FindNode-
Neighbors exchanges. Figure 4.5 compares the sent and received traffic volume of Ping
and FindNode messages. The lack of incoming FindNode and Ping messages suggests that
only a few nodes on the network know about us because our node ID has not propagated
12
sync complete
M
es
sa
ge
s 
pe
r 
se
co
nd
Time (UTC)
Handshake
Ping
Pong
Disconnect
Subprotocol
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
00:30 am
01:00 am
01:30 am
02:00 am
02:30 am
03:00 am
Figure 4.3: P2P traffic volume by message type
throughout the network.
4.1.2. P2P disconnect reasons
Disconnect Reason Count Percentage
Subprotocol error 885 50.66%
TCP sub-system error 588 33.66%
Useless peer 166 9.50%
Too many peer 60 3.43%
Disconnect requested 31 1.77%
Client quitting 16 0.34%
Already connected 1 0.06%
Table 4.1: Disconnect reasons
During the 3-hour run, the client logged 1,747 P2P disconnections with 7 different
reasons, as shown in Table 4.1.
TCP sub-system error
Out of 588, only 16 referred to actual P2P connections that ended due to timeout.
569 of them referred to TCP connections that lasted less than 1 second and ended without
any P2P response, implying that they did not actually communicate DEVp2p at the adver-
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Figure 4.4: Discovery traffic volume by message type
tised address. In other words, 32% of disconnects were caused by attempting to make peer
connections with non-DEVp2p nodes.
Useless peer
At the P2P layer, only 9.5% disconnects were caused by useless peers, those who did
not run the Ethereum Wire subprotocol. However, among those running the subprotocol,
peers who report incompatible network ID and genesis block hash or do not participate in
the same fork of the blockchain are also considered as useless peers. We looked at details of
other disconnect reasons and found that , 646 out of the 885 ‘Subprotocol error’ disconnects
were due to genesis block mismatch and 15 were due to network ID mismatch. From the
31 ‘Disconnect requested’, we also found 2 due to genesis block mismatch and 2 due to
providing wrong extra data for the fork check. In total, 831 out of 1,747, almost half of the
disconnects were caused by useless peers.
4.2. NODE DISCOVERY
Throughout our data collection, we use two approaches to find node addresses to
be scanned: active and passive discovery. The active discovery continuously requests other
DEVp2p nodes to find a randomly-generated node ID and collects node addresses from the
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responses. The passive discovery collects the addresses of incoming peer connections.
We initially considered using ethernodes.org as another source of our scanning
targets as the website has been monitoring the network for years and provides information
of more than 20 thousand nodes [10]; however, we were unable to reach the website owner.
Upon a further examination, we learned that the data available on the website does not
differentiate publicly reachable and unreachable nodes and often reports nodes’ ephemeral
ports instead of their listening ports. As we intend to scan and maintain peering with the
publicly reachable targets, we found the data not suitable for our use.
4.2.1. Active discovery
Recall that DEVp2p nodes, hence all Ethereum nodes, rely on the RLPx node dis-
covery protocol to find each other. Every node participating in the discovery maintains a
routing table that assigns other node addresses to buckets based on their XOR distances
from the ID of the table owner, each bucket storing up to 16 entries at any time. Using the
protocol, a node sends FindNode requests to others to find a randomly-generated ID, and
the recipients send back Neighbors responses containing 16 node IDs that are closest to the
target according to their routing tables. For our first discovery approach, we rely on this
process to enumerate other nodes’ routing tables.
We first look at how Geth implements the protocol. First, Geth invokes the discovery
process under two conditions: (1) when it refreshes its table entries every hour, (2) when
it needs to make new outgoing peer connections but node addresses from last discovery
results are not enough to occupy all available slots. Second, Geth stores the new addresses
in its routing table without validating their status. When the buckets are already full, Geth
checks the status of old entries and replace the inactive entries with the new addresses. It
also manages a separate database to store addresses that are validated through ping-pong
exchanges for 24 hours since last seen. Lastly, unlike BitTorrent’s use of Kademlia-based
DHT which “piggybacks maintenance traffic onto application traffic” [7], only the discovery
protocol interacts with the routing table; active peer connections are not used as another
source of node discovery and do not affect the routing table in any way.
Knowing that lack of peer connection does not negatively affect discovery process and
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rather increases the process frequency, we simply make Geth to skip dialing after finding
new nodes so that it does not stop the discovery. Also, since the routing table entries are
quickly replaced and tend to be invalid addresses, we make Geth to provide the valid node
addresses from its database rather than the routing table to our scanning processes. We
leave other settings and variables, such as Kademlia concurrency factor, bucket size, and
discovery interval, as default values.
Bootstrap nodes
Geth contains 5 different lists of bootstrap node addresses. At launch, it chooses one
based on which Ethereum network it is configured to join. The presence of these separated
lists seem to imply that each network has designated bootstrap nodes to serve as its gateways.
After a few data collection, however, we noticed that our node discovery client, which was
configured to join the Mainnet, eventually found non-Mainnet—and even non-Ethereum—
nodes indicating that addresses from outside of the Mainnet must have propagated into the
Mainnet nodes’ routing tables.
To widen our discovery client’s initial search scope, we added other networks’ boot-
strap nodes to our default list. In addition to 5 lists hardcoded in Geth, we found 8 more
lists from Parity, another popular Ethereum client, total of 61 bootstrap node addresses from
8 different networks, namely Mainnet, Classic, Morden, Ropsten, Rinkeby, Kovan, Expanse,
and Musicoin.
4.2.2. Passive discovery
Recall that our observation of Geth’s behaviors in Section 4.1 suggested the lack of
incoming connections. We performed a similar experiment using a node ID that had been
actively used in our experiments for over four months and observed much more frequent
incoming peer connections, always filling all 50 incoming connection slots until the maximum
allowed number of peers was reached. We hypothesize that if our node ID has propagated
throughout the network, a passive approach that uses node addresses of the incoming peer
connections as our scanning and peering targets is more efficient than the active discovery
approach for the following reasons:
• The passive discovery finds currently active nodes, whereas the active discovery finds
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nodes that have been active within 24 hours.
• The passive discovery finds DEVp2p nodes, whereas the active discovery finds nodes
that participate in the node discovery.
To perform the passive discovery, we make three changes to Geth. First, we make
Geth to ignore the maximum allowed number of peers, allowing unlimited number of connec-
tions. Unlike the active discovery in which we make no peer connections, passive discovery
maintains the connections and behave normally as an effort to not waste others’ node dis-
covery attempts. As we do not have unlimited resources, however, we gracefully disconnect
all active connections every 30 minutes. Second, during the DEVp2p protocol handshake
phase of every incoming connection, we retrieve node ID from the received Hello message
and attempt to resolve its node address using the discovery protocol. The resolve process
is necessary because we want to know the listening port of other nodes, not the ephemeral
ports used for the connection2. If the resolve fails, we leave the listening port as unknown,
implying that the node may not be publicly-reachable. Lastly, for every new peer connec-
tion, the client stores the node’s information to our SQL database, described in Section 4.4.
In addition to updating the address, the DEVp2p information, and the Ethereum status of
the node, it also records whether the node supports the DAO fork or not, which we use to
determine if the node truly belongs to the Ethereum Mainnet or the Ethereum Classic.
4.3. SCANNING
Recall that communications between Ethereum nodes rely on 3 different application
layer protocols: RLPx node discovery, DEVp2p, and Ethereum subprotocol. We scan nodes
using each protocol separately to verify their availability at each layer. Based on nodes’
responses to the scans, we categorize them as followings:
• Advertising nodes communicate the RLPx Node Discovery protocol through their ad-
vertised UDP port.
– Verified nodes communicate the DEVp2p Wire protocol.
∗ Available nodes accept new peer connections.
2The DEVp2p Hello message structure includes listening port field; however, to our knowledge, the field
has served no purpose since the discovery protocol was separated from DEVp2p protocol. Geth does not use
the field and leaves the value as 0. Our data shows that all nodes running Geth report 0 for this field.
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∗ Busy nodes reject new P2P connection.
∗ Unexpected nodes send unexpected DEVp2p responses.
∗ Ethereum nodes are Available and run the Ethereum service.
– Unverified nodes fail to complete DEVp2p communication.
4.3.1. RLPx scan
DEVp2p nodes rely on Ping and Pong messages of RLPx node discovery protocol to
determine if other nodes are participating in the node discovery. Following this, we send out
Ping messages to our target node addresses and expect Pong responses.
Advertising
When a node responds within our time limit (500 milliseconds), we log its address,
namely node ID, IP address, and advertised TCP and UDP port. We categorize the re-
sponding nodes as Advertising.
4.3.2. DEVp2p scan
As described in Section 3.2, DEVp2p nodes exchange Hello messages when setting up
peer connections. We initiate peer connections with our target node addresses and expect
to receive their responses, either Hello messages or Disconnect messages specifying the
reason, within our time limits (15 seconds for TCP dial timeout and 30 seconds for idle
connection). If a connection attempt results in either a TCP timeout or a connection reset,
we exclude the node address from scan result.
Verified and Unverified
If a TCP connection is established but ends as an idle connection (e.g. with EOF
error), we log the node address, namely node ID, IP address, and advertised TCP port, and
note the connection error. We categorize such node as Unverified. Other nodes that send
any valid DEVp2p response are categorized as Verified.
Available
If we receive a Hello message, we log the node address and information found in
the message, namely protocol version, client name, capabilities, and listen port, then we
gracefully terminate the connection. We categorize such node as Available.
18
Busy
If we receive a Disconnect message with reason being “too many peers”, we log the
node address and note the reason. We categorize such node as Busy.
Unexpected
If we receive any other message, we log the node address and indicate that an unex-
pected response is received. We categorize such node as Unexpected .
4.3.3. Ethereum scan
Ethereum communications take place on top of active DEVp2p connections; there-
fore, the scan details are similar to those of the DEVp2p scan. Only difference is that upon
receiving DEVp2p Hello messages, instead of logging the node information and disconnect-
ing, we complete the DEVp2p connection and attempt to establish Ethereum connections.
Similar to DEVp2p connection, Ethereum connection requires exchanging Status messages.
To avoid peers rejecting us for being incompatible (e.g. network ID or genesis block hash
mismatch), we wait for them to send their Status messages without sending ours. Follow-
ing the details provided under Section 4.3.2, we categorize nodes as Verified, Unverified,
Busy, or Unexpected and log their information accordingly.
Ethereum
If we receive a Status message, we log the node address and information found in
the message, namely protocol version, network ID, total difficulty, best block hash, and
genesis block hash, then we gracefully terminate the connection. We categorize such node
as Ethereum.
4.3.4. Use of ephemeral node IDs
In order to successfully communicate with DEVp2p nodes using the 3 protocols, our
scanners also need to have a node ID. Normally, a DEVp2p node is expected to continue
using the same ID. We choose to use a different node ID for every scan to cause less harm
to the network. If our scanners continue to use the same ID, and their addresses propagate
throughout the network, they may appear to be active nodes. This could cause other nodes
attempt to connect to our scanners, which are practically useless nodes.
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Using ephemeral IDs for DEVp2p and Ethereum scans should not cause any harm
because P2P communications do not influence nodes’ routing tables or node database, as
explained in Section 4.2.1. For RLPx scan, the ephemeral IDs will fill up other nodes’ routing
table and node database; however, they do not remain long enough to cause harm to the
network. Our addresses will stay in node database for 24 hours, or however long the client
keeps inactive addresses, but their reputation will only get worse for failing to respond to
FindNode requests and soon be removed from taking part in the node discovery. They will
be removed from routing tables much quicker, possibly as soon as next node discovery occurs
and new addresses replace them, or when they are manually removed for failing too many
FindNode requests.
4.4. DATA COLLECTION
Our data collection consists of two phases with different goals. The first phase,
from June 21st to October 13th in 2017, aims to understand population of the DEVp2p
network in general. The second phase, from October 13th to November 12th in 2017, aims
to identify the publicly-reachable Ethereum nodes that we plan to peer with. We use different
sets of discovery and scanning approaches during each phase (see Section 4.2 for discovery
approaches and Section 4.3 for scanning approaches). All discovery and scanning processes
were run on a single server equipped with 2.1GHz x 32 logical cores, 128GB memory, and a
10Gigabit Ethernet link.
The node information learned from all scans are stored in a SQL database, using node
ID as the primary key. We continued using the same database during the second phase. The
types of stored information are listed below, each annotated with its source:
• Node ID (all scans, passive discovery)
• IP address (all scans, passive discovery)
• TCP port (all scans, passive discovery)
• UDP port (RLPx scan, passive discovery)
• DEVp2p Wire protocol version (DEVp2p scan, passive discovery)
• Client Name (DEVp2p scan, passive discovery)
• Capabilities (DEVp2p scan, passive discovery)
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• Listen port (DEVp2p scan, passive discovery)
• Ethereum Wire subprotocol version (Ethereum scan, passive discovery)
• Network ID (Ethereum scan, passive discovery)
• Total difficulty (Ethereum scan, passive discovery)
• Best block hash (Ethereum scan, passive discovery)
• Genesis block hash (Ethereum scan, passive discovery)
• Last peering time (passive discovery)
• DAO fork check (passive discovery)
• Last RLPx scan time (RLPx scan)
• RLPx scan counter - total (RLPx scan)
• Last TCP scan time (TCP scan)
• TCP scan counter - total (TCP scan)
• Last DEVp2p scan time (DEVp2p scan)
• DEVp2p scan counter - total (DEVp2p scan)
• DEVp2p scan counter - Hello (DEVp2p scan)
• DEVp2p scan counter - busy (DEVp2p scan)
• DEVp2p scan counter - unexpected (DEVp2p scan)
• Last Ethereum scan time (Ethereum scan)
• Ethereum scan counter - total (Ethereum scan)
• Ethereum scan counter - Status (Ethereum scan)
• Ethereum scan counter - busy (Ethereum scan)
• Ethereum scan counter - unexpected (Ethereum scan)
4.4.1. Phase 1
We used the active discovery approach that learns node addresses from other nodes’
routing tables. At the beginning of each scan cycle, we obtained a list of target addresses
from the discovery client’s node database, which stores all addresses that are last seen within
24 hours. We used the RLPx scan to identify currently advertising nodes, the DEVp2p scan
to determine if they are available for new peer connections, and the Ethereum scan to
determine if they run the Ethereum service. Through the DEVp2p and Ethereum scans,
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we also collected additional information from the nodes’ handshake messages. After every
scan, we updated the SQL database with new information about nodes. The discovery
client’s database provided about 10 thousand node addresses for each cycle, and each scan
against the 10 thousand nodes finished within 30 seconds. Considering the data processing
time and occassional delays, we allotted 4 minutes to each cycle. Table 4.2 summarizes the
scan results. Nodes are categorized based on their responses to our scans, as described in
Section 4.3.
Scan type
(# scans) # Nodes by Category Total
RLPx
(42,023) 4,355 Advertising 4,355
DEVp2p
(41,121)
3,410 Verified 551 Unverified 3,9611,169 Available 2,240 Busy 1 Unexpected
Ethereum
(39,196)
3,123 Verified 186 Unverified 3,309678 Ethereum 2,444 Busy 1 Unexpected
Table 4.2: Average results of Phase 1 scans
On average, we established TCP connections with 3,961 nodes but received valid re-
sponses from only 3,410. We speculate that the other 551 nodes that did not send any P2P
response were not DEVp2p nodes and resulted in disconnects due to ‘TCP sub-system error’,
as we saw in Section 4.1.2. Of the valid responses, only 1,169 were handshake messages indi-
cating successful peer connections, while 2,240 were disconnect messages indicating that the
nodes could not accept more connections because they had too many peers. The Ethereum
scan results are interpreted in a similar fashion. The difference between number of Available
nodes and Ethereum nodes suggests that about 500 nodes did not run the Ethereum service
and were not able to establish Ethereum connections. The slightly higher number of Busy
nodes seen by the Ethereum scans is due to the nodes checking their number of active peer
connections once more during the Ethereum connections.
The 400 node difference between the total number of nodes from the RLPx scan
and the DEVp2p scan seems to be caused by dedicated bootnodes, which participate in node
discovery but do not run any P2P service. According to the Geth documentation, such nodes
are used to help finding nodes in private networks [15, 16]. The difference between the total
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number of nodes from the DEVp2p scan and the Ethereum scan is caused by our oversight.
We did not consider logging the nodes that successfully made peer connections but did not
run the Ethereum service; as a result, their responses were not included in our counts.
To summarize our findings from the Phase 1 results, out of the most recently seen 10
thousand nodes reported by the discovery client, more than 3 thousands are verified to be
publicly-reachable active DEVp2p nodes; however, more than half are not available for peer
connections due to having too many peers.
4.4.2. Phase 2
We used the passive discovery approach that uses incoming connections as scanning
targets. Because the discovered nodes are guaranteed to be active, we did not need to
rely on scans to verify their availability. We, however, continued using the Ethereum scan
to determine which nodes are publicly-reachable. At the beginning of each scan cycle, we
obtained a list of target addresses from the SQL database, which the passive discovery
client updated in real-time. Since the goal of the Phase 2 was to identify as many publicly-
reachable Ethereum nodes as possible, we targeted all nodes we have discovered thus far
to compensate for the nodes we previously failed (or would fail in future scans) to identify
as Ethereum nodes due to them rejecting peer connections for having too many peers. We
continued updating the SQL database with every scan results, mainly to keep track of the
publicly-reachable nodes. The first scan of the Phase 2 finished scanning a little more than
190 thousand nodes within 20 minutes. Considering the data processing time and occassional
delays, we allotted 30 minutes to each cycle. Table 4.3 summarizes the scan results. Nodes
are categorized based on their responses to our scans, as described in Section 4.3.
Scan type
(# scans) # Nodes by Category Total
Ethereum
(1,615)
3,841 Verified 3,560 Unverified 7,4011,254 Ethereum 2,586 Busy 1 Unexpected
Table 4.3: Average results of Phase 2 scans
Compared to the Phase 1 result, the total number of successful TCP connections
doubled. While the increase was largely due to connections with no valid DEVp2p responses,
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which is not surprising considering that we scanned all addresses collected over 4 months,
the number of Ethereum nodes doubled as well. Figure 4.6 shows that the number of Verified
nodes from each scan had increased over time, from less than 3,500 to over 4,500, validating
the effectiveness of the passive discovery approach as it found more than a thousand nodes
that were not discovered during the Phase 1.
4.5. PEERING
As shown in studies on other P2P networks [30, 31], constructing network topology is
a crucial part of network measurement. It is used to identify fundamental network properties,
such as node connectivity and centrality. As a first step toward inferring topology of the
Ethereum Mainnet, we observe how transaction messages propagate throughout the network.
The messages are collected by our peering client that constantly requests the Ethereum
Mainnet nodes we have identified with our discovery and scanning. As higher number of
peers will produce transaction logs representing a larger portion of the network, we modify
Geth to deviate from its normal behaviors so that it maintains more peer connections for
longer durations. Through many iterations, we identify causes of disconnections and increase
in per-peer resource usage that often accumulates enough to crash the instance.
4.5.1. Static dialing
We first modify how the client makes peer connections. Because we limit our con-
nections to only the publicly-reachable Ethereum Mainnet nodes we have identified and do
not want any incoming connection, we disable the TCP listener and the node discovery. To
peer with our targets, we use Geth’s static-nodes feature which ensures connections with
target addresses and re-connects to them when disconnected. Target addresses are added to
the client using admin.addPeer() method through its console. To allow unlimited number
of connections, the maximum limit is always ignored. Lastly, we increase the maximum
number of file descriptors allowed to the client from the hardcoded 2,048 to 1,048,576 (our
data collection server OS’s hard limit) as we found the default limit too low to maintain all
the peer connections.
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4.5.2. Increased dial rate
As discussed in Section 4.4, more than half of the nodes reject peer connections be-
cause they already reached the maximum allowed number of peers. However, our observation
in Section 4.1 suggests that nodes frequently disconnect their peers for various other reasons,
so we aim to claim those briefly available slots by re-dialing at a faster rate than that of
a normal client. We increase Geth’s maximum allowed number of concurrent dials from 16
to 500 and the re-dial frequency from every 30 seconds to every 1 second. To prevent the
client from re-dialing unavailable nodes indefinitely, we modify the re-dial condition so that
on every 10th re-dial to the same address, a penalty delay is applied. Every time the penalty
occurs, the delay is increased by 5 seconds up to 30 seconds. When the maximum 30-second
delay is reached, the address is removed from the static-nodes list so that it is not dialed
again.
4.5.3. Protocol changes
We observe that Geth immediately disconnects a peer if it fails to decode or handle
a message properly, making it the most common cause of disconnections. Our modification
minimizes this behavior by ignoring errors from failing to decode any Ethereum message,
except the BlockHeaders message which determines whether the peer is on the same side
of the DAO fork. We also prevent our client from relaying any transaction message because
we want to collect the same transaction messages from all the peers and analyze how the
information propagates throughout the network. As the client does not relay transactions,
we disable its transaction pool entirely and further reduce resource usage. Lastly, when the
client determines that a peer is useless because of network ID, genesis block hash mismatch
or failing the DAO fork check, it removes the peer’s address from the static-nodes list so
that it is not dialed again.
4.5.4. Logged information
For the information propagation analysis, we log all incoming transaction messages,
a single transaction per line. Each entry includes the message arrival time, the node ID of
the relaying peer, the smoothed round-trip time between our client and the peer, and the
has of the transaction. If transactions arrive in a batch, all transactions are logged with the
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same arrival time, node ID, and round-trip time. The smoothed round-trip time is obtained
directly from the P2P connection’s TCP socket. To complement the transaction logs, we
also log the client’s current block number and status of all active peers every 3 minutes. The
peer status includes node ID, client name, addresses of both endpoints of the connection,
connection duration, smoothed round-trip time, total difficulty, and best block hash. For
monitoring and debugging purposes, the size of the static-nodes list and the number of
static dials are logged as well.
4.5.5. Selecting peer candidates
After every Ethereum scan completes, we select a new set of peer candidates from
our SQL database, described in Section 4.4. As the database stores any DEVp2p node, not
just the Ethereum Mainnet nodes, we use the following criteria for the selection:
• Last Ethereum scan time should be within an hour prior to the current time to
ensure that the node was verified to be publicly-reachable during the most recent scan.
• Network ID is 1.
• Genesis block hash is ‘d4e56740...b1cb8fa3’.
• DAO fork is true.
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CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS
5.1. NETWORK POPULATION
We scanned the Ethereum’s P2P network over a five-month period, from June 21st
to November 12th in 2017, and identified 153,075 publicly-reachable DEVp2p nodes. To
understand the general trends in the network, we first analyze the network population based
on all of the collected data. We look at how the network is distributed based on a number
of different information, namely services provided by a node, the node’s client information,
and the Ethereum network that the node participates in. Once we identify the Ethereum
Mainnet nodes, we further look at the distribution of the Mainnet specifically.
5.1.1. DEVp2p Network Distribution
By service
We look at the distribution of the DEVp2p nodes based on the services they run. From
the nodes’ service information, we found 23 different protocol names: brn, bzz, dbix, ed,
ele, eth, exp, hive, istanbul, les, par, pip, glx, golem_proto, mc, nucov01,
p2p, pss, shh, shift, task_proto, ur, vch. Based on our knowledge of the proto-
cols, we identified some services and categorized the protocols as followings:
• Ethereum - eth, les, pip
• Swarm - bzz, hive, pss
• DubaiCoin - dbix
• Expanse - exp
• Whisper - shh
• Elementrem - ele
• UR - ur
• GLXCoin - glx
• Golem - golem_proto, task_proto, p2p
Swarm is a decentralized storage service. Whisper is a decentralized messaging ser-
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vice. Both Swarm and Whisper are considered to be part of a large vision of the Ethereum
as a world computer [13]. DubaiCoin, Expanse, Elementrem, UR, GLXCoin, and Golem are
Ethereum-like services, also referred as forks or clones of the Ethereum service. We consider
pip, a protocol designed for light clients used by the Ethereum-like services, as part of the
Ethereum service only if it is the only protocol used by the node. Otherwise, we do not cat-
egorize it as any specific service. We also do not consider par, a extension to Ethereum-like
subprotocols, as any specific service. If we do not know what service (subprotocol) runs on
a node but we know some other information that would be available from nodes running
the Ethereum service, such as genesis block hash, then we consider the node as running the
Ethereum service.
Service Count Percentage
Ethereum (ETH) 122,622 80.11%
Swarm 14,647 9.57%
DubaiCoin (DBIX) 2,157 1.41%
Expanse (EXP) 1,543 1.01%
Whisper 1,016 0.66%
Elementrem (ELE) 144 0.09%
UR (UR) 29 0.02%
Istanbul 17 0.01%
GLXCoin 16 0.01%
7 others 28 0.02%
Unknown 11,870 7.75%
Table 5.1: Services on DEVp2p network
Following our service categorization criteria, we found 122k nodes running the Ethereum
service and 18k nodes running some subset of other 15 services, as shown in Table 5.1. We
note that 1 node was found running Swarm with Ethereum and 1,015 nodes were found
running Whisper with Ethereum. We were not able to verify service information of almost
12k nodes because they never responded our scans with the handshake messages—because
they were Busy—on neither the DEVp2p Wire protocol nor the Ethereum Wire subprotocol.
We group those nodes as Unknown.
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Client Count Percentage
Geth 99,831 65.22%
swarm 14,646 9.57%
Parity 7,401 4.83%
GMC 3,565 2.33%
Gubiq 3,225 2.11%
Gdbix 2,157 1.41%
Gexp 1,491 0.97%
eth 433 0.28%
gwhale 312 0.20%
46 others 1,455 0.95%
Unknown 18,559 12.12%
Table 5.2: Distribution of DEVp2p network by client
By client
Since each of these protocols should be running on some kind of client, we look at the
distribution of the nodes based on their client types. The breakdown for the nodes is shown
in Table 5.2. We see that the Ethereum nodes are further split as expected, Geth being the
most popular with 99k of the 122k Ethereum nodes using it. The next most popular client
is swarm, followed by Parity. The other popular clients are GMC (Geth-based client for
Musicoin), Gubiq (Geth-based client for Ubiq network), and Gdbix (Geth-based client for
DubaiCoin). It is worth noting that the number of nodes running the Gdbix client and nodes
running the DubaiCoin service exactly match. Similary, the number of nodes running the
swarm client and nodes running the Swarm service differ by only 1. We speculate that there
exists only one implementation for those services, unlike Ethereum, because DubaiCoin is a
rather small community and Swarm is a service that is still under development. We were
not able to verify client information of more than 18k nodes, similar to the Unknown nodes
found in Section 5.1.1. More nodes are grouped as Unknown this time because nodes’ client
types, unlike the services running on the nodes, cannot be inferred the Ethereum service
information.
Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of different versions of Geth from each scan result
over time. As soon as a new version is released, the number of nodes running the new
version increases, slowly replacing the population of the previous versions. The consistent
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Figure 5.1: Time series graph of Geth version distribution
pattern throughout the multiple version releases suggests that a decent portion of the network
actually cares about keeping the client software up-to-date.
Ethereum networks
Network ID Genesis Block Hash Name Count Percentage
1 d4e56740...b1cb8fa3 Mainnet 83,237 67.88%
3 41941023...d1ca4a2d Testnet (Ropsten) 9,287 7.57%
4 6341fd3d...5767e177 Testnet (Rinkeby) 5,174 4.22%
7762959 4eba28a4...4ac952e9 Musicoin 3,632 2.96%
88 406f1b7d...047418af Ubiq 3,248 2.65%
10101 86bbabdf...9d09e074 801 0.65%
42 a3c565fc...5ce32cb9 Testnet (Kovan) 492 0.40%
511337 6577484f...f9be44e1 Akasha 368 0.30%
11199 7fb357f2...7dc07414 317 0.26%
2,416 others 7,990 6.52%
Unknown 8,076 6.59%
Table 5.3: Ethereum networks
We now look at the Ethereum nodes specifically and their distribution by different
Ethereum networks. Following the Ethereum clients’ handshake procedure, we determine
which network nodes participate in based on the network ID and genesis block hash found in
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their Ethereum Status message. Table 5.3 presents the distribution of the 122k Ethereum
nodes by networks. We identified a total of 2,425 unique combinations of network ID and
genesis block hash. We found that 67% of the Ethereum nodes reported information match-
ing the Mainnet. Among other combinations, we found 3 that match the information of the
known Ethereum test networks: Ropsten the official testnet, Rinkeby the testnet used by
Geth clients, and Kovan the testnet used by Parity clients. Additionally, we identified a few
other private networks, such as Musicoin—a blockchain used for sharing music.
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Figure 5.2: Time series graph of number of network IDs
To observe the general trend, we also look at the number of unique network IDs and
networks (network ID and genesis block hash) found in each scan response over time. In both
Figure 5.2 and 5.3, we see that the numbers increase over time. What’s more interesting,
however, is how the two graphs react differently when the data collection phase changes. As
we moved on from Phase 1 to Phase 2, we changed our scan targets from the discovered
nodes within 24 hours to all known nodes in our database; therefore, a sudden increase in
number is expected. The increase in the number of network IDs is quite subtle, going from
~120 to ~130. In contrast, the number of networks goes from ~300 to ~700. Put differently,
there has been about 2.5 genesis block hash matched with every network IDs during Phase 1.
After the phase change, the rate increased to more than 5.5 genesis block hash per network
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Figure 5.3: Time series graph of number of networks
ID. The difference indicates that when creating networks, people tend to choose network IDs
that are used by existing networks but select genesis block hash more randomly.
Mainnet discrepancy As explained in Section 3.3.2, the DAO hard fork in 2016 split the
Mainnet into two, the Mainnet and the Classic. Geth verifies if a connected peer is actually
on the Mainnet by requesting the header of a specific block known to exist on the Mainnet’s
blockchain. We use the same approach to verify the 83k nodes that appear to be on the
Mainnet. Over the five-month period, 19,090 nodes were verified as Mainnet nodes. 423
nodes that responded with an unexpected block header were verified as non-Mainnet nodes.
We cannot claim that they are Classic nodes because there may exist other networks that
use the same network ID and genesis block hash besides the Classic. We could not identify
other 63,724 nodes because they either never accepted our connections or their blockchain
were not synced far enough to respond to our block header request.
5.1.2. Ethereum Mainnet Distribution
We further break down the 19k nodes on the Ethereum Mainnet by their client
information. We also look at the distribution of listening port numbers.
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By client
Table 5.4 is discussed in Section 5.2.1.
Client Count Percentage
Geth 17,601 92.20%
Parity 1,264 6.62%
teth 55 0.29%
Ethereum(J) 12 0.06%
eth 4 0.02%
Weth 1 0.01%
Unknown 153 0.80%
(a) Clients
Client Count Percentage
v1.7.2 12,871 73.13%
v1.7.1 1,620 9.20%
v1.6.6 886 5.03%
v1.7.0 729 4.14%
v1.6.7 504 2.86%
v1.7.3 346 1.97%
v1.6.5 294 1.67%
v1.6.1 72 0.41%
v1.6.0 61 0.35%
30 others 218 1.24%
(b) Geth versions
Table 5.4: Distribution of Ethereum Mainnet by client
Port number
In a previous study on the BitTorrent P2P network, Dinger et al. [9] state that the
file-sharing P2P clients have changed from using a default port to randomly choosing one
in order to avoid port filtering by ISPs and show that “each of the 65,536 possible ports is
occupied by some peers of the network with an average of 78 peers per port,” the largest
portion using same port being less than 4% of the network.
TCP Port Nodes Percentage UDP Port Nodes Percentage
30303 18,130 94.97% 30303 17,334 90.80%
30304 113 0.59% 30304 115 0.60%
30302 25 0.13% 30302 25 0.13%
30305 17 0.09% 1025 21 0.11%
2743 11 0.06% 1024 18 0.09%
74 others 795 4.16% 610 others 1,578 8.27%
Table 5.5: TCP and UDP port distributions
In comparison, Geth and Parity, the two most popular clients on the Ethereum Main-
net, are implemented to use port 30303 by default for both the UDP-based node discovery
and the TCP-based peer communication, but they do allow users to change the port. Table
35
5.5 shows the distribution of the TCP and UDP ports found in the most recent node address
records of the Ethereum Mainnet. We find that more than 90% of the network use the de-
fault port 30303. While our data suggests a quite noticeable difference between the number
of unique ports on TCP and UDP, many of the UDP ports appear to be ephemeral ports
ranging from 1024 to 65406, which most likely resulted from our modified client attempting
to resolve addresses of the peers of the incoming connections to determine if they are publicly
reachable.
(Mis)use of “Listen Port” field
We identified 16,552 nodes, more than 92% of the Mainnet, that fill the “Listen Port”
field of the DEVp2p Hello message with 0, regardless of their actual listening port. 99%
of those nodes run some version of Geth and the remaining 1% run clients compiled with
Golang, most likely some variants of the official Golang implementation of the Ethereum
protocols. All other clients used by the rest of the network, namely Parity, Ethereum(J),
and eth, report the correct information—a number that matches their actual TCP listen
port.
5.2. SNAPSHOT OF ETHEREUM MAINNET
In order to better estimate the state of the Ethereum Mainnet at a certain point
in time, we look at 2,214 peers reported by a snapshot taken during the same period we
consider for the information propagation analysis, between 9pm and 10pm on November
10th of 2017 (UTC).
5.2.1. Distribution by Client Type
In Table 5.4, we identified 7 different client types on the Ethereum Mainnet based on
the aggregate data, more than 90% of the network running Geth. According to Table 5.6,
85% of the peers from our snapshot were running Geth. While the difference is not significant,
we find the lower percentage a bit surprising. One interpretation is that users tend to run
short-lived nodes (i.e. newcomers exploring Ethereum, researchers, developers) using Geth,
the most popular client. We also compare the distributions by Geth versions and find that
more than 80% of Geth peers from the snapshot were running v1.7.2 the most up-to-date
stable version, increased from 73% based on the aggregate data. This suggests that many of
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Client Count Percentage
Geth 1,883 85.05%
Parity 330 14.91%
teth 1 0.05%
(a) Clients on Ethereum Mainnet
Client Count Percentage
v1.7.2 1,595 84.71%
v1.7.3 91 4.83%
v1.7.1 82 4.35%
v1.6.7 32 1.70%
v1.6.6 27 1.43%
v1.7.0 23 1.22%
v1.6.5 9 0.48%
v1.5.9 7 0.37%
v1.6.0 5 0.27%
9 others 12 0.64%
(b) Geth versions
Table 5.6: Distribution of Ethereum Mainnet snapshot by client
the nodes that our aggregate data reports to be running older versions are likely no longer
active.
5.2.2. Peer Latency
(37,0.2)
(178,0.8)
2,214 peers
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Figure 5.4: CDF of measured latency to Ethereum peer
In a previous study on the Gnutella network, Saroiu et al. [31] measures latencies
between their measurement node and Gnutella peers to verify that the network is formed
in an unstructured (ad-hoc) way. Following the approach, we determine how the Ethereum
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Percentage Ethereum Mainnet Gnutella [31]
20% < 37ms < 70ms
80% < 178ms < 280ms
Table 5.7: Comparison of Ethereum and Gnutella peer latencies
Mainnet is structured by looking at the measured latencies between our measurement node
and its peers—as explained in Section 4.5.4, the smoothed round-trip time is obtained di-
rectly from each peer connection’s TCP socket. Figure 5.4 shows a CDF of the measured
latencies, and Table 5.7 summarizes our observation and those of Saroiu et al. We observe
that 20% of the peers have latencies of at least 178ms, and another 20% have latencies of at
most 37ms. The Mainnet connections exhibit much lower latencies in general; however, the
closest 20% of the peers are 4.81 times closer than the furthest 20%, a much larger difference
than what was observed from the Gnutella peers. From this, we find that the connections on
the Ethereum Mainnet, like those on the Gnutella network, form an unstructured network.
Country Peers Percentage
United States 928 41.9%
Germany 163 7.4%
China 128 5.8%
Russia 115 5.2%
France 106 4.8%
Canada 99 4.5%
United Kingdom 86 3.9%
Netherlands 69 3.1%
South Korea 52 2.3%
Ukraine 43 1.9%
57 others 425 19.2%
Table 5.8: Mainnet peer distribution by country
One explanation for the much lower latencies observed in our experiment is that the
Gnutella study was done more than 16 years ago and the current physical infrastructure
most definitely allows faster communications. Another explanation is that the Ethereum
Mainnet nodes are simply much closer to our measurement node than the Gnutella peers
were to the measurement node at the time. To support this, we look at the geolocation
distribution of the Mainnet peers, shown in Table 5.8. We find that while the locations of
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the peers are distributed among 67 different countries, more than 40% of them are located
in the United States.
5.2.3. Peer Connection Length
(3.98,0.5)
(27.96,0.8)
2,214 peers
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Figure 5.5: CDF of Ethereum peer connection length
Percentage Ethereum Mainnet Gnutella (2001) [31] Gnutella (2005) [29]
50% < 3.98hr < 1.00hr < 1.19hr
80% < 27.96hr < 3.00hr < 3.72hr
Table 5.9: Comparison of Ethereum and Gnutella peer connection lengths
We look at the lengths of the Ethereum Mainnet peer connections and compare them
to those of the Gnutella peer connections. We obtain each peer’s connection length from the
peer’s status logged every 3 minutes—as explained in Section 4.5.4. Figure 5.5 shows a CDF
of the connection lengths, and Table 5.9 summarizes our observation and those of previous
studies on the Gnutella network [29, 31]. We observe that the median peer connection
length on the Ethereum Mainnet is 3.98 hours and 20% of the connections last more than
27.96 hours, clearly outlasting the Gnutella connections. From this, we determine that
the Ethereum Mainnet has a much lower level of churn compared to the Gnutella. Saroiu
et al. [31] explained that the short connections observed on the Gnutella network is not
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surprising as the typical usage of the network is downloading a small number of music files.
In contrast, the Ethereum Mainnet connections are expected to last long because the peers
try to keep their states synced with the network’s blockchain—a single, enormous file whose
content constantly changes. We note, however, that our observation likely suggests longer
connection lengths than what typical Mainnet peers experience because our measurement
node was run using a client modified to avoid disconnections as much as possible, as explained
in Section 4.5.3.
5.3. INFORMATION PROPAGATION ANALYSIS
Our peering client logged all transaction messages from 9 am on November 9th to
3 pm on November 12th in 2017. We analyze the collected messages to understand how
information propagate throughout the Ethereum network and identify anomalies. We look
at the messages logged from 9 pm to 10 pm on November 10th—the time period in which
the client reached the highest number of peers after it stabilized to maintain at least 2,000
peers. We find that a vast majority of transactions propagating in the network are in fact old
transactions propagated by unsynced peers. Considering the volume of the old transactions,
we suspect that they waste peers’ resources and cause noticeable amount of delays to new
transaction propagation.
5.3.1. Number of Transactions
We look at the number of transactions that we received from each peer. Figure 5.6
shows that more than 90% of the peers send over 1k transactions—with more than 70%
sending over 10k transactions. We also note the vertical line around 17k that represents
almost half of our peers.
5.3.2. Single-peer Transactions
We look at how many different peers each transaction comes from. We expect that
each transaction propagates throughout the network—at least until the transaction is con-
firmed in the next mined block—and we should receive the same transaction from multiple
peers. In Figure 5.7, however, we see that 50% of the transactions come from only one peer,
and about 75% come from less than ten. Using a more recent state of the blockchain, we
check the confirmation timestamps of the single-peer transactions and find that they fall
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Figure 5.6: CDF of number of transactions sent by peer
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Figure 5.7: CDF of number of peers transaction comes from
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Figure 5.8: CDFs of block number difference
Only the peers that sent us any transaction are considered.
into one of three categories:
• The transaction has already been confirmed before our one-hour timeframe
• The transaction is eventually confirmed but after our timeframe
• The transaction is not confirmed
5.3.3. Unsynced Peers
We look at how close the peers were to the head of the blockchain during the analyzed
timeframe. As described in Section 4.5.4, we logged our client’s best block number and status
of the peers’ status every 3 minutes. We determined each peer’s best block number at the
time based on their reported best block hash. We assume that our client—connected to
more than 2k nodes—has always maintained the most recent state of the blockchain and use
its best block numbers as the reference to determine how close each peer was to the head of
the blockchain at the time.
Figure 5.8 shows CDFs of the block number differences of all peers that sent any
transaction. We see that about 80% of the peers are less than 20 blocks behind, with about
70% being less than 10 blocks behind, indicating that most of the peers had been almost fully
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synced. However, we also observe that about 10% were sending transactions while having
extremely outdated blockchain, some more than one million blocks behind. We speculate
that the unsynced peers are the cause of the propagation of old transactions.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
In this thesis, we measure the Ethereum’s peer-to-peer (P2P) network to provide
a better understanding of the previously unexplored network. Using the Ethereum’s net-
working protocols, we find nodes and collect their information. Based on the data collected
over a five-month period, we examine the DEVp2p network, the underlying P2P network of
Ethereum. We identify publicly-reachable Ethereum Mainnet nodes and maintain at least
2k peer connections. We analyze the peers and information propagation on the network. We
compare the network’s properties to those of other P2P networks.
We find that the DEVp2p network is a highly diverse environment shared by multiple
services, and the Ethereum Mainnet makes up only 12% of the network. We observe that
almost half of disconnects experienced by our Mainnet nodes were caused by non-Mainnet
or non-Ethereum nodes. Second, the peer connections on the Mainnet is formed in an
unstructured way and exhibit much lower level of churn compared to those on the Gnutella
network. Lastly, from our transaction analysis, we find that there exist a large volume of
old transactions—no longer useful to the network—that continue to be propagated by peers
with outdated blockchain.
Due to lack of time, many experiments and analysis have been left for the future. The
next step to follow this work is to infer the Mainnet’s topology through a further analysis
of transaction and block propagation and to identify fundamental network properties, such
as node connectivity. The inferred topology and the findings in this work could be used to
examine whether cryptocurrencies in general exhibit properties similar to the ones seen in
the Ethereum Mainnet. Another interesting area to investigate is classification of unordinary
nodes—such as those with outdated blockchain—and measuring their impact on the network
stability.
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